Two events, one week apart, reveal a troubling pattern. On 14th February, US vice president J.D. Vance launched an assault on the EU at the Munich Security Conference, followed by a brazen demand that Ukraine surrender half its future mineral wealth in exchange for continued US military aid. A week later in Sofia, a violent mob linked to the pro-Russian, nationalist Revival party attacked the EU’s office in the Bulgarian capital.

These events are symptomatic of a broader geopolitical realignment in which eastern Europe risks being cast adrift from the West. Trump’s recent overtures to Vladimir Putin resemble a sinister recreation of the 1945 Yalta conference, which preceded the cold war division of Europe. For eastern Europe, this risks undoing the democratic progress which began in the early 1990s and returning to illiberal regimes; marionette institutions; raging, unchecked oligarchy; and silenced civil societies.

Appeal in the east

The American nationalist right, led by figures like Vance and businessman-cum-presidential-advisor Elon Musk, has found common cause with its European counterparts. Europe’s right-wing leaders offer the Maga theorists ideological camaraderie in their culture wars against social liberalism and a bulwark against continued EU efforts to promote democratic governance. Their ultimate goal is not just to weaken Brussels, but to dismantle it altogether.

Recent ECFR polling suggests that in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, large sections of the population expect Donald Trump’s return to the White House to be beneficial. At 47%, nearly half of Bulgarians—along with sizable shares of Hungarians and Romanians—believe a second Trump presidency is good for America. While enthusiasm wanes regarding Trump’s impact on their own countries (this total falls to 28% among Bulgarians) an ideological affinity remains—and in eastern Europe, the appeal of Trump is partly symbolic

He projects an image of raw strength, a leader unafraid to dispense with democratic niceties in a dangerous world. Much of the polled populations see Trump’s blunt authoritarianism as, paradoxically, refreshing rather than threatening; akin to the cartoon (which first appeared in the New Yorker in early 2016) of a wolf campaigning in a field of sheep under the slogan “I will eat you.” One sheep turns to another and remarks: “At least he tells it like it is.”

Many in eastern Europe, who feel that the EU and the previous, more liberal US administrations, have long relegated them to the periphery of decision-making, do not expect Trump to elevate their social or economic status. But they do expect him to dispense with the hypocrisy and treat them less like second-class citizens.

Pursuing illiberalism

Beneath the bluster, Trump’s agenda is far more radical. He and his ideological allies—including but not limited to Vance, Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s Robert Fico—share a common goal: dismantling the post-1990s consensus that liberal democracy represents the pinnacle of governance. These leaders reject the transatlantic model of checks and balances, the rule of law and institutional accountability as essential to prosperity. Instead, they embrace an illiberal vision in which strongmen rule, unencumbered by judicial oversight or free media, underlined by a predatory nationalism.

Trump’s rhetoric already resonates in eastern Europe. His proposal to criminalise student protests seems particularly ominous in a region where mass demonstrations, such as in Serbia or Georgia, have played a role in increasing democratic resistance. Governmental attempt to suppress civic activism revives memories of pre-1990s authoritarianism; now the population protests, while leaders such as Aleksander Vucic and Milorad Dodik stand by their connection with Trump.

Equally concerning is the Trump camp’s decision to halt enforcement of the anti-money laundering Corporate Transparency Act. Bringing corruption funds to light has been one of the most difficult policies in eastern Europe in the past decades; in a region where high-level corruption is endemic, the US Magnitsky Act and state department visa blacklists were among the few effective deterrents against oligarchical impunity.

Now, rather than targeting kleptocrats, there are whispers that it is anti-corruption activists who could end up on American punitive lists. In Romania, far-right presidential candidate Calin Georgescu has been banned from running in the country’s upcoming election due to illegitimate Russian interference. In response, Georgescu has openly welcomed the prospect of US sanctions on Romania’s current government, in order to reshape his country’s political landscape.

Ukraine, the litmus test

But it is Washington’s evolving stance on Ukraine that lays bare the true nature of this Faustian bargain between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right. At ceasefire negotiation talks in Riyadh, for which Ukraine was conspicuously absent, Russian officials reportedly proposed that America withdraw from NATO’s easternmost member states, effectively rolling back the alliance to its pre-1997 borders. The American delegation, led by US secretary of state Marco Rubio, declined—but added the chilling caveat: “for now.” A new “global Yalta”, comprising Trump, Putin and perhaps Xi Jinping, is no longer unthinkable.

For eastern Europe, the implications are existential. They would bear the brunt of Trump’s trade war with Europe, such as an imposed 25% tariff on European steel and aluminum, according to a recent report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. More crucially, should their leaders secure an audience with Trump, recent history dictates that they can expect to be treated as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky was in March’s Oval Office meeting: with transactional disdain.

Unreliable allies

It could be assumed that an American administration ideologically aligned with Europe’s nationalist right would serve them as their useful ally against Brussels. But the eastern European far-right has placed its bets on a partner who is fundamentally unreliable. The region’s nations hope to free themselves from what the far-right view as the constraints of liberal democracy. Yet, in doing so, they may find themselves isolated from the EU and unprotected by Washington.

The alternative is clear. Those who oppose nationalist backsliding must work to strengthen democratic security within their own borders. Accountability must be reinforced, with independent media playing a crucial role. In the past, US agencies such as USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute provided vital support. With those lifelines now cut, the EU must step in.

Brussels should channel funding directly to NGOs and regional governments, bypassing nationalist-led administrations where democratic norms are under siege. The EU needs to strengthen the European Public Prosecutor’s Office by giving it more prerogatives and resources; it should expand the scope of the European Magnitsky Act to also cover corruption. Most importantly, the EU should use the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act to leverage its regulatory power and to shield its public sphere from foreign manipulation—whether from China, Russia or an unfriendly White House.

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The stakes are high. Should Trump’s vision for a divided Europe and a “global Yalta” materialise—and eastern Europe find itself abandoned by the EU—the continent’s eastern flank could spin into a cycle of instability, tug-of-war politics and regional conflict. And at least one European war has started from this point.

Garvan Walshe is co-founder of electoral integrity NGO Unhack Democracy and founder of democratic tech startup Article 7.