With the US election just two months away, European decision-makers have gone from grappling with Trumpian nightmare scenarios – new trade wars, abandoning Ukraine, withdrawing from NATO – to experiencing an emotion they had almost forgotten: hope. Vice President Kamala Harris’s ascent to the top of the Democratic ticket has eliminated Donald Trump’s polling lead and allowed Europeans to contemplate alternatives to their worst-case scenario.

Yet, even if Harris wins, it would be foolish to expect complete continuity with Joe Biden’s administration. Europe remains unprepared for what’s coming. 

While Trump and J.D. Vance’s talk of ending US support for Ukraine has set off alarms in European capitals, a Harris administration’s Ukraine strategy probably would depart from the status quo, too. As the war grinds on, US officials have lost confidence that Ukraine will capture and hold enough ground to break the current deadlock. Despite the Ukrainians’ offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, they are still losing ground in Donetsk. Recovering the territory they have lost since February 2022 becomes more unlikely by the day. 

Thus, a Harris administration would have to look for ways to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the short term in order to pivot towards a settlement. Knowing better than anyone that their situation is bleak, the Ukrainians have been looking for a way out of the stalemate. Though they have launched their Kursk gambit, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said in July that he wants the “hot stage” of the war to end this year. Privately, Ukrainian leaders may be hoping that the United States will push them to the negotiating table, as that would provide the political cover they need to change course. Such discussions are already well underway in Washington.

This might come as a shock to those Europeans (including the next high representative for foreign affairs) who still talk about supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” and whose rhetoric has hardly changed since 24 February 2022. Whatever happens, the challenge for Europeans is to ensure that the war does not result in a “peace” on Russian terms: a demilitarised Ukraine that is forced to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and the European Union. 

Trade policy will be another major issue. Trump is promising a blanket 10 per cent tariff on all imports, and new tariffs of 60 per cent or more on all goods from China (in addition to all the restrictions already introduced by the Biden administration). Faced with US tariffs and pressure from the Trump administration to apply its own tariffs on Chinese goods, Europe would find itself in an extremely difficult position.

But, again, there is no reason to expect that Harris would have a significantly softer China policy than Biden (whose approach has been much tougher than Trump’s was while in office). The anti-China consensus in the US is solid, and in her few public statements on the matter, Harris has voiced strong support for Taiwan and complained about China dumping “substandard products into our economy.” While her running mate, Tim Walz, has visited China many times, he has done so largely as an advocate of human rights. 

Unlike Trump, Harris has been vocal in her support for America’s network of alliances. But this commitment might make her expect more from US allies. Moreover, since she is no dyed-in-the-wool Atlanticist like Biden, the broader trend of US foreign policy shifting away from Europe and toward Asia would persist. When Europeans talk about investing more in defence, they should ask themselves whether they are merely trying to placate Trump, or whether they are genuinely serious about providing for their own long-term security. 

Much of the task of envisioning what a Trump or a Harris presidency would mean for Europe will fall on the new European Commission, which will have to start preparing Europeans so that they do not panic if their biggest fears regarding Ukraine or China are realised. Failure to do so will increase the likelihood of a disjointed response, with smaller member states possibly peeling off to pursue bilateral deals with the US. It will be up to the bigger countries to calm their smaller counterparts (many of them in eastern Europe). 

To that end, recasting relations with the United Kingdom could be a game-changer. If the EU and the UK can work in lockstep on geoeconomic issues, they will have more policy leeway and clout vis-à-vis the US and China. Although the UK cannot replace the US, its reintegration into European defence and technology frameworks could significantly bolster the continent’s strategic position. UK prime minister Keir Starmer’s new government has already embarked on an enhanced security and defence partnership with Germany, and similar deals with likeminded members could follow, culminating in a pact with the EU as a whole. 

Poland and the Baltic and Nordic countries will likely take the lead in pursuing this outcome, but French president Emmanuel Macron may emerge as the key swing vote. Will he embrace a geopolitical vision of bringing the UK into the European fold on defence, technology, and climate issues? Or will he channel Charles de Gaulle by sidelining Britain, thus weakening the EU in the process? One thing is clear: Whether the next US president is Trump or Harris, Europeans must start planning for a change.

This article was first published in Project Syndicate on 6 September 2024.