Problem

Thirteen years after civil war erupted in Syria – a conflict that killed as many as 500,000 people and resulted in six million refugees – Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s brutal rein is over. On Saturday night, Assad fled the country and rebels swept into Damascus in a breathtaking seizure of power that unfolded over just ten days.

European governments have met the development with welcome shock as well as with deep uncertainty over what comes next. There are already fears regarding the Islamist nature of Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS), the former al-Qaida group that leads the rebel movement; of intensified chaos, violence, and fragmentation amid a possible contested transition; as well as the conflict between Turkey and Syrian Kurds giving ISIS new space to exploit.

Solution

But even as they focus on these risks, Europeans should first concentrate on the opportunity presented by Assad’s demise and recognise that the core driver of instability, brutal violence, and refugee outflows from Syria has departed the scene.

European governments should view what happens in Syria, a key Mediterranean state, as a core strategic interest and channel political attention and resources to supporting an inclusive, Syrian-led, power-sharing transition and wider reform. This is the only viable pathway towards securing European interests, whether it be regional stability and preventing new conflict and terrorism; allowing millions of Syrians to finally return home; or permanently diluting the hostile regional influent of external powers like Russia.

But Europe’s biggest hope should now lie in the agency of Syrians themselves. Many long for a stabilising transition, having internalised the deep cost of ongoing conflict. HTS is a clear example of this, though it needs to be carefully tested: it has moderated its ideological position, broken with al-Qaida, and initially committed to an inclusive process that protects the rights of all Syrians, as demonstrated by reassuring outreach to the country’s minorities. It has also worked quickly to protect state institutions, including initially keeping Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali, Assad’s last prime minister in place, to prevent the country’s descent into new chaos.

For their part, European states should approach the situation with caution and modesty. But they can start by supporting the prospect of a re-energised, UN-supported process that may – amid the cacophony of actors – be the only means of drawing together various internal and external players. They can also intensify engagement with Turkey, which holds influence over the rebels, to press for an inclusive approach. This would include giving Syrian Kurds a political pathway towards integration within new state structures. These should address their needs, as well as Turkish concerns over Kurdish autonomy.

Europeans can seek to incentivise HTS’s continued moderation, including through direct engagement and sanctions exemptions if the group backs an inclusive approach.

Finally, Europeans can also provide more immediate humanitarian and economic support, including through a rapid lifting of sectoral sanctions. They should be wary of throwing money at the problem, which risks driving a new war economy and conflict, but should make a significant offer of intent – for example, reconstruction support if an inclusive political transition can be locked in.

Context

Amid fears that the rebel advance would reignite Syria’s civil war, the regime’s fall was far quicker and less bloody than anyone could possibly have imagined, especially given the belief that Russia and Iran would continue their support for Assad. But the continued hollowing out of his regime finally left it helpless.

Turkey, which backed the rebels, also appears to have reached an agreement with Moscow, Tehran, and other Arab states – facilitated by opposition outreach – to hold back support for the regime and agree to Assad’s removal.