Nearly 8,000 kilometers separate Taipei and Kiev, but reminders of the fate of Ukraine are ever-present in Taiwan’s capital. They are seen in a yellow solidarity wristband with the word “unbroken” emblazoned in blue, a symbolic gift from the mayor of Lviv to his Taiwanese hosts. A Ukrainian flag drapes the wall of a meeting room, while a Taiwanese activist fighting Chinese disinformation wears a smaller version on his lapel as a sign of solidarity. Every conversation holds the shared conviction: the struggles of these two geopolitical theatres are inextricably intertwined.

Ukraine and Taiwan see themselves as being on the front line of defence of democracy, freedom and information warfare. Both have to hold their own against powerful, authoritarian neighbours, who are closely collaborating to exert maximum pressure. “Russia and China have employed an identical narrative to justify their actions against us,” explains a Taiwanese researcher. “They claim that we have no right to make our own choices, that we possess no identity of our own, and that our governments are mere puppets of the United States.”

Trump’s Indo-Pacific playbook

The US is a key source of defence and security support for Ukraine, but for Taiwan it is even more critical. Although cooperation with Japan and the Philippines has been enhanced, Taipei cannot withstand a Chinese attempt to take the island by force without the US. The images of US president Donald Trump publicly humiliating Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky at the Oval Office, followed by America’s abrupt suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine, has cast a shadow of strategic uncertainty over Taiwan.

Some in the Trump administration argue that America’s support for Ukraine undermines its commitment to the Indo-Pacific and must be swiftly terminated. However, this offers little reassurance to Taipei regarding Washington’s broader dedication to defending democratic partners and upholding institutional norms.

Instead, many in Taiwan are now questioning whether the Trump playbook in the Indo-Pacific is truly distinct from the Trump playbook in Europe, or whether it might be the next to be abandoned over a hemispheric pact, a strategic détente or a “peace deal” with China in which Taiwan’s status becomes a bargaining chip. These anxieties are fueled by Trump’s remarks suggesting that Taiwan has stolen the US chip business or should pay the US as “insurance company” for its “protection” from China.

Courting Trump

As US support is indispensable to Taiwan, the Taiwanese government is making every effort to court the Trump administration. It wants to increase defence spending from 2.45% to over 3% of GDP, primarily by investing in American-made weapons systems. This is not necessarily just out of courtesy, but also out of necessity, since most other nations have generally found it difficult to engage in defence sales to the island.

Simultaneously, Taiwan’s semiconductor powerhouse, TSMC, is creating manufacturing capacity for advanced chips in Arizona, committing $100bn in investment in production and research in the US. Taiwanese experts are working to alleviate concerns that this move will weaken Taiwan’s “silicon shield”, emphasising that semiconductor production in Taiwan will remain dominant for the foreseeable future.

It is clear that China stands to gain from widespread doubts, both in Taiwan and globally, about America’s reliability. “They must have been holding a lot of parties in Beijing lately”, a Taiwanese academic concluded. Trump’s statements are already stirring up doubts about the reliability of the US security partnership, which in turn undermines Taiwan’s resilience. This is not welcome in a political landscape already deeply polarised over its relationship with Beijing.

In parallel, the freeze in US foreign aid under the Trump administration has severely impacted many Taiwanese civil organisations—particularly those dedicated to promoting democracy and/or working on Chinese disinformation. Many feel that, with Trump’s inauguration, Taiwan has lost its most important values partner in the global systemic competition and that Trump’s policies actively bolster authoritarian leaders in China and Russia.

In the meantime, the Trump administration is sending mixed signals. Defence secretary Pete Hegseth’s first trip to the Indo-Pacific was designed to reassure allies and partners in the region.  He did not only visit Japan and the Philippines, Taiwan’s most important regional partners, but also Guam, the US territory in the west Pacific that serves as a key US base. It is crucial for US military power projection in case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. At the same time, however, the tariff salvo against Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan on  “Liberation Day” and the firing of senior officials in the US National Security Council—seen as a bastion of “China hawks” just days after the visit—has likely had the opposite effect for partners in the region.

Based on a close relationship with some of these Republicans in Washington, the hope among Taiwan’s policy elite has been that things are different for Taiwan: that it matters more to the US core interest in keeping China’s regional ambitions at bay, and that a mix of investment in the US, defence purchases and keeping a low profile will be enough to weather the next four years.

It is, however, a strategy that contrasts to most European allies who are eager to lower their dependence on US security guarantees and go into a trade confrontation with the US. The truth is that, where Europe has leverage and options in its own neighbourhood, Taiwan does not.

A role for Europe?

Europeans cannot replace the pivotal role the US has traditionally played in Taiwan’s defence, and nor should they attempt to. The Taiwanese authorities fully understand this, recognising the lack of credible alternatives in Asia or beyond to a solid security relationship to Washington. However, the arrival of the second Trump administration presents an opportunity to deepen EU-Taiwan cooperation and help both sides, in their shared interests, to pursue their different strategies. This would not require Europe to abandon its long-standing positions on cross-straights issues as they can easily develop primarily through deeper dialogue between experts, civil societies and business communities

Europe is keen on deeper technology cooperation with the Asian powerhouse. The TSMC investment in Dresden is a first step, but Europe would welcome more. At the same time, Europeans can provide low-key support to enhance Taiwan’s resilience, which has accumulated invaluable experience in countering hybrid threats—these range from undersea cable sabotage and the protection of critical infrastructures, to cyberattacks.

With Europe struggling with similar issues, intensified information exchange and low-level coordination could be a helpful first step. If Europe decides to become bolder in its exchange with one of Asia’s most advanced democracies, an initiative towards alternative technology supply chains that excludes high-risk authoritarian vendors would be another area which could potentially deepen the collaboration.

Taiwan’s manufacturing know-how and Europe’s scale could be a mutually beneficial combination, particularly on dual-use drone technology. And Taiwan’s experience in information warfare and the future of AI-powered disinformation campaigns should be part of a European conversation. In this area it is Taiwan today and Europe tomorrow.

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All quotes and research are taken from, or based on, private background conversations during an ECFR study trip which took place in Taiwan from the 15th to the 22nd March 2025.