The first-ever summit between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council takes place on 16 October in Brussels. In recent years, GCC countries have become ever-more important geopolitical actors in the Middle East and North Africa. From Europeans’ point of view in particular, this summit is a chance to lay the foundations for greater strategic interdependence with Gulf actors. The gathering could provide the political impulse long needed to inject energy into this relationship.

EU-Gulf relations have, of late, become increasingly active. Two years ago, the EU and its member states dusted off plans for technical and policy cooperation, which resulted in the bloc’s first-ever Gulf strategy. Europeans since worked to operationalise it, although with mixed results. In 2023, the UAE hosted COP28, which was a catalyst for advancing energy and climate conversations between European and Gulf states. There are common ambitions, too, on the shared connectivity agenda, as seen at last year’s G20 meeting in New Delhi which endorsed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic corridor (IMEC). This agreement met GCC ambitions to serve as a hub between Asia, Africa, and Europe and European ambitions to diversify from Chinese trade overdependence.

This month’s high-level EU-GCC summit has a packed agenda, whose key items include: trade; a bid to find common language on major geopolitical questions, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine; and preventing the implosion of conflict fronts in the Middle East, including in Israel-Palestine, the Red Sea, Lebanon, and Iran.

Trade

All sides have high expectations for boosting sectoral cooperation, which European policymakers view as the key platform to advance strategic interdependence on the ground. Here, trade liberalisation might be the most prized and yet complex geoeconomic dossier. Last year, the EU started looking at ways to reboot EU-GCC negotiations for a free trade agreement – which began in 1989 and were frozen in 2008 – only to find that little has changed. Key voices on the GCC side still reject the inclusion of human rights clauses, environmental standards, and specific language on public procurement, which are fundamental to all EU free trade agreements. Despite this, a bloc-to-bloc agreement remains a fixation for Brussels, but also for Riyadh, whose rivalry with Abu Dhabi is driving it to do all it can to prevent the EU and the UAE signing a bilateral comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA). This month’s summit is the opportunity for both sides to finally agree what approach they will take on trade.

Indeed, an approach that goes beyond the narrow mechanics of an EU-GCC deal could prove fruitful, such as by adding a bilateral layer. But the EU should not follow an Emirati format (like CEPA) in the pursuit of these bilateral negotiations. One ultimate outcome that this summit could set in train might be a more generic trade liberalisation agreement at the EU-GCC level, but which is then complemented by more specific sectoral bilateral agreements via the EU’s own strategic partnership agreements. Indeed, recent encouraging results from the technical talks for the EU-UAE CEPA could incentivise attempts to try for a different format. This would help all parties avoid the traps of mounting Saudi-UAE geoeconomic competition.

Geopolitics

On the geopolitical front, much is on the table. GCC capitals want to understand if the dialogue they had with Josep Borrell as EU high representative can continue with his successor, Kaja Kallas. Gulf policymakers suspect she might be less interested in their region than Borrell was and too hawkish on Russia and China, with which Gulf players want working relations. They also seek clarity on the overlap or hierarchy with the new commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica.

On Russia, while Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have made significant mediation efforts between the warring parties – such as on the release of Ukrainian children detained in Russia and the exchange of prisoners of war – there is no common analysis between the Europeans and the Gulf states on the conflict’s genesis and resolution. In 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted an important meeting between national security advisers of the West and the global south (without China, which declined to attend). Saudi Arabia was then slated to host a second iteration of Ukraine’s Global Peace Summit. That is no longer happening, however, amid Saudi insistence that some Russian presence be allowed. Some Gulf states have been very receptive to Russia’s narratives and upgraded their relations accordingly – be it to coordinate oil policy, explore opportunities for sanctions proofing, or leverage Russian vulnerabilities to court Moscow’s geopolitical support in the Middle East or Africa.

At the EU-GCC summit, Europeans will want to tackle the question of Gulf states’ ties with Russia. They can do so by conveying three messages. Firstly, that European support for Ukraine will remain strong even if a new US administration turns its back on Kyiv. Secondly, that, despite tactical coordination, Russia is fundamentally a competitor with Gulf states in a tightening energy market and is bound to attack GCC market shares in Asia, as shown by its constant cheating on OPEC+ production quotas. Thirdly, that Russia is a wholly unreliable geopolitical partner, as its ever-closer military partnership with Iran demonstrates. Through this partnership, Russian hypersonic missiles have shown up in the arsenals of the Houthis, who are still technically at war with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Middle East

But to come out of the summit with enhanced strategic interdependence between the EU and the GCC, Europeans will also need to do less lecturing and more listening, specifically on issues pertaining to the Middle East. While there is broad EU-GCC alignment on condemning both Hamas’s brutal attack on 7 October and Israel’s all-out aggression in Gaza, breaching of international humanitarian law, and escalation towards both Iran and Lebanon, Europeans should much more openly and proactively support attempts by countries in the Gulf to contain the explosion of a regional conflict. Europeans should focus on a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon and a two-state solution as the only meaningful political way out, and leverage international law to marginalise the radical and extremist elements in the Israeli government, creating space for an alternative leadership. Finally, Europeans should actively encourage GCC-Iranian diplomatic channels, recognising their value to manage conflict, including on the emerging Israel-Lebanon front.

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This month’s summit could open up new possibilities for both sides (including on energy and climate, which also features on the agenda). Emerging middle powers in the Gulf are already influencing the new multipolar world order, and it makes sense for Europeans to seize such opportunities in pursuit of strategic interdependence with these players. To achieve this, all sides will need to show the political will necessary to unlock these opportunities.