Just 25 kilometres south of the Bulgarian city of Varna lies the Kamchia health resort. The complex, which borders a stunning Black Sea beachfront, boasts sports facilities, conference halls – and even a planetarium. What makes it unique, however, is that the resort is owned by Moscow City Hall.

Russia’s interest in this scenic stretch of the Bulgarian coast dates back to the end of the 1990s. During this decade, the transformation of the ownership of Bulgarian state tourism operator Balkanturist began, following the collapse of the communist regime in the late 1980s. By 2008, Moscow owned the Kamchia resort, having successfully bypassed constitutional provisions prohibiting foreign citizens from acquiring Bulgarian property. At the opening of a children’s camp in Kamchia in 2010, Moscow’s mayor Yuriy Luzhkov stood alongside Bulgarian prime minister Boyko Borissov and enthusiastically declared, “We are two nations, two peoples, but we share one heart.”

In June 2022, three months after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, Bulgaria’s then-foreign minister Teodora Genchovska downplayed Moscow’s control of Kamchia, stating that Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security had so far received no information that the complex’s ownership by Moscow posed any threat. This is despite Russia already labelling Bulgaria as a ‘hostile country’ and targeting it with Kremlin-led hybrid attacks via the publication of disinformation and propaganda. But Genchovska’s dismissal of Russia’s involvement also seemed to ignore remarks made by foreign minister Sergey Lavrov in 2019 when he praised Kamchia as a prime example of Russia’s “soft power” abroad.

Russia’s transmission of messages laced with communist-era rhetoric across a European Union member state might have been the apex of the countries’ complex political and economic relationship. But it also demonstrates how Russia legitimises its activities in EU territory by using the contested Black Sea as an entrance point. Despite Russia’s escalatory discourse, however, the EU has so far deprived the wider Black Sea region of the diplomatic attention it deserves.

After Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the region became a daunting crossroad of geopolitical interests whose complexities provide European policymakers with justification for inaction. Then, in 2023 – one year into the Russia-Ukraine war – the Black Sea grain deal between Turkey, Russia, and the UN collapsed. Russia blocked shipping for over two months, including in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone, due to ‘military exercises’. Only when NATO suggested that Moscow’s actions could be treated as an escalatory risk did Russia pull out its training activities. In March 2024, a concentrated effort by Ukrainian military and naval forces against Russia’s Black Sea fleet saw the UK defence ministry declare it as “functionally inactive”.

Ukraine’s recent success against Russia’s Black Sea fleet should prompt the EU to develop its own Black Sea ‘strategic thinking’. Furthermore, the EU can build on the regional presence of America and NATO to assert its interests – including free trade, energy diversification, and democratic governance – across the broader region.

The first step is for Brussels to demonstrate the political will to view the Black Sea as critical to Europe’s long-term security and prosperity. This is crucial, since Ukraine’s success in the Black Sea humiliated Russia, making it more likely that Russia will push strongly for disruptive tactics such as regional disinformation campaigns, maritime blockades, and attacks on civilian vessels carrying Ukrainian grain. And while the EU’s Black Sea Synergy is a comprehensive regional initiative to encourage cooperation between its littoral states, it lacks the necessary political muscle to address growing security concerns and adapt to ongoing geopolitical shifts driven by the war in Ukraine. The backing of major EU member states such as France, as a nuclear power, will therefore be crucial in strengthening EU security policy towards the Black Sea.

The new European Commission will also coincide with the Polish presidency of the EU Council, which begins in early 2025. Since Poland is invested in supporting Ukraine via heightened defence of the Black Sea region, together the commission and council could demonstrate the EU’s commitment to countering Russian influence – for example, via a heavyweight political visit to strategic maritime locations such as Varna, or the Romanian city of Constanta. Diplomatic visibility and a show of regional support would also be an added safeguard against Russian calls for NATO’s withdrawal from Bulgaria and Romania.

Bolstering the EU’s regional presence would also benefit its enlargement policy, particularly with regard to the accession processes of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. EU member states exploring the Black Sea’s economic, trade, and energy potential could create stronger platforms for integration and further align their regional goals with the EU single market. In the meantime, while the EU decides on the scope of its European defence, it can still rely on effective NATO-led initiatives such as strengthening air defence to protect the alliance’s eastern flank.

Bulgaria and Romania should also not be underestimated: Bucharest and Sofia could help counter Moscow’s attempted disruption by acting as regional leaders in defining the bloc’s approach towards the Black Sea. This is particularly in energy security, trade, and connectivity, and by strengthening ties with Turkey in order to further initiatives within NATO. The capitals could also work on a bilateral level with the Black Sea’s littoral states to advance the EU’s agenda on democratic resilience. To achieve this, the EU should set aside financial means: harnessing Bulgaria’s and Romania’s regional and historic knowledge should be regarded as an investment in stabilising future relations. On a pragmatic level, the EU’s Black Sea strategy should also pay close attention to monitoring shifts in drug trafficking patterns which have emerged as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and in fighting endemic corruption across the Black Sea region. After all, it is not in the EU’s interest to be surrounded by ‘captured’ states.

It is clear that any moves from Western allies will not come without pushback. As Vsevolod Samokhvalov argues, Russia perceives the Black Sea as a proof of its belonging to the European civilisation. By aligning with the Slavic people in the 19th century and presenting itself as the saviour of the suppressed south-eastern Europe orthodoxies, Russia has long developed a sense of ownership over the region. While NATO strengthens its eastern flank, Moscow will try to retain its influence in the Black Sea by targeting public opinion over fears of conflict escalation – and in a region vulnerable to disinformation, Bulgaria is top of its list.

But the Black Sea’s intricacies should not deter EU policymakers from developing an action plan. As Russia’s regional military grip weakens, there is a window for EU intervention. The Black Sea has long been a shortcut for Russia to spread propaganda and cultivate regional dependencies – the EU is now primed to help develop a strategic vision in an area still searching for a coherent identity.

With thanks to Damian Koltchakov for his support and encouragement.