For Africa watchers, Donald Trump’s first stint in the White House was defined by three iconic episodes. The 45^th president set the tone early with his comments about African countries being “shitholes.” Then there was the utter confusion as a khaki-clad secretary of state Rex Tillerson rushed back from his first official trip to Africa, only to be given The Apprentice-style ‘you’re fired’ treatment on Twitter. Finally, Melania Trump finished up with a right-wing hook: a less-than-successful attempt to get the pith hat back in fashion on a visit to Kenya.

European officials might be tempted to scream at a Brussels side-alley wall when contemplating Trump’s policies on Ukraine, Gaza, or tariffs. But on Africa, at least, they probably can breathe a measured sigh. Much like America’s policy towards China, how it engages with Africa seems to be one of the few holdouts in bipartisan politics. Unlike US-China policy, however, this is mainly because Africa is so low on Washington’s agenda that it often becomes subservient to other foreign policy objectives.

Regardless, African and European officials should prepare for Trump to play a wild card regarding security. It is simply not clear what ‘America First’ will mean regarding boots on the ground in Africa and military assistance to the continent.

Shifting conflict centres

During the last Trump administration, the president made fighting Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria a mainstay of his foreign policy. He cultivated his image as the slayer of jihadi bosses, proclaiming in a 2019 speech – accompanied by many a gesticulation – that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi “died like a dog.” But on Africa, two paradoxical things happened. The US at once massively upped its drone strikes in Somalia to never-before seen levels, while Trump dramatically decreased the number of US troops on the continent from 5,000 to about 1,500.

Now the centre of the jihadist conflict has shifted to West Africa’s Sahel, with one in every four deaths from terrorist violence last year occurring in Burkina Faso. But it somehow seems unlikely that, this time around, Trump will give the West African jihadist commanders as much attention as their Middle Eastern counterparts.

A second administration might decide that the security crises on the continent are too bothersome for even the limited attention they get now. Indeed, if one thing is certain about the incoming administration’s US security policy on Africa, it is that Trump is likely to be even less willing than Joe Biden to expend any US political capital with the Gulf states – which hold the key to stopping the conflict in Sudan – and trying to push through a peace process in Sudan, the largest humanitarian crisis on earth.

Likewise, whether a new administration would continue to counter Russia’s influence in Africa – which Biden’s administration seems to have been doing quietly and effectively – is another wild card hidden behind the misty Kremlinology of Trump’s personal relationship with president Vladimir Putin and the latter’s rabid aggression towards Ukraine.

Strength through growth

Analysts probably should not put too much credit in the Heritage Foundation’s 920-page ‘Mandate for Leadership’. Even so, it is worth considering the singular page devoted exclusively to what a new Trump policy towards the youngest and fastest-growing continent might look like.

Some sentences on the growing geostrategic importance of sub-Saharan Africa to the US seem to be lifted from Biden’s 2022 Africa Strategy. “[Africa’s] explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance,” declares the opening paragraph, seemingly in mimicry. Then, amid the regular analytical banalities, the author recommends shifting from assistance to a growth model, countering “malign” Chinese influence, and advocating an end to pushing policies “birthed in the American culture wars” like abortion access and LGBT rights.

The idea that Trump’s White House will massively boost autocratic tendencies across Africa seems a somewhat shallow take. Of course, it is bad news for those who champion the principles of an open society and it no doubt leaves US officials even less room to criticise the actions of autocrats. But if Americans are honest with themselves, both Democrats and Republicans have always been willing to support African strongmen who take a pro-US stance – going all the way back to Zaire’s president, Mobutu Sese Seko.

Personnel dependencies

A huge amount of US-Africa policy will depend on which officials Trump appoints, the tone he sets, and the issues which capture his administration’s imagination. South African-born Elon Musk and the MAGA’s movements foundations of Christian nationalism clearly have sway on Trump’s thinking, and it is conceivable that this could highlight surprising issues. The 47^th president may suddenly become more vocal about the murder of white farmers in South Africa or Christians in Nigeria, for example.

A couple of general predictions can be made with a degree of certainty. The US will almost certainly see its Africa policy through more of a Chinese lens. Under Biden, officials made a valiant effort to engage with Africa on its terms, not always through the prism of great power politics. But with Trump in the White House, wresting influence away from Beijing will be front and centre of the administration’s approach to Africa.

This could mean, for example, US recognition of Somaliland as a hedge against Chinese gains in neighbouring Djibouti, where Beijing and Washington both have a permanent military presence. But it will still be an uphill slog for Washington. US trade with the continent sat at around $47.5 billion in 2023, compared to some $283.1 billion between China and Africa – while the number of US diplomats in Africa has recently fallen slightly, to around 2,000.

The name of the game will be transactionalism and bilateralism, not development and multilateralism. Some African presidents, ever distrustful of Western support for civil society programmes, might even appreciate this clear-cut approach. Judging by campaign rhetoric, the United States Agency for International Development will increasingly be seen through an “America first” narrative. Every dollar spent will be balanced against what its investment brings to the country’s companies, citizens, and interests. Furthermore, US support for family-planning programmes or LGBT rights in Africa will likely evaporate.

America’s landmark African Growth and Opportunity Act, which was launched in 2000 to provide eligible countries with tariff-free access to certain products in the US market, does not seem to align with the MAGA talk on tariffs. Should this be on the chopping block in 2025, it would have disastrous effects for South Africa in particular.

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While America’s future policy on Africa remains unclear, Trump’s re-election underscores the need for a coordinated and mutual European-African policy on the big strategic issues. Neither Europe nor Africa can rely on a rational, level-headed Washington anymore. But if the right tone is set, it could help usher in a renewed spirit of collaboration between the two continents.

Nowhere is this clearer than on security. A vast stretch of land across from the southern flank of Europe, stretching from Mali to Sudan, is on fire. So far, European states have been woefully incapable of navigating the new fractured world of disinformation, mercenaries, and putschists, and of putting aside differences to become an effective force for peace and stability. Democratic leaders in Africa have not fared much better.

Europeans need not be alarmist, however. These are tough challenges ahead, but they are not insurmountable. Trump’s re-election highlights the need to stay engaged in the Sahel wherever realistically possible, to throw their weight behind the peace process in Sudan, and overcome the petty divisions that often leave Europe less than the sum of its parts.