The appointment of the new European Commission, which will begin its work in November, comes at a critical time for the European Union. Between 2002 and 2022, the bloc’s share of global GDP decreased from 19.9 per cent to 14.8 per cent; the war in Ukraine is entering its third year; and the results of recent national elections suggest sections of the EU population is being swayed by populist rhetoric. Where the EU could previously rely on its high economic footprint to secure global influence, it must now instead focus on improving its approach to security. Furthermore, to keep its citizens onside and instil confidence, the bloc needs to demonstrate strength amid the global power struggle by acting on its geopolitical declarations. In doing so, the EU could once again demonstrate that it fulfils a globally stabilising role underpinned by reliability towards its allies.

One of the first challenges facing the new commission will be developing and refining its strategy towards the Unites States – regardless of whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump takes the White House. The EU-US symbiotic relationship remains strong, with the EU especially reliant on the US as a key ally in many areas including trade and security. But the first Trump administration’s unwillingness to collaborate with the EU on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal demonstrated how prolonged strain can threaten the relationship. Mistrust and frustration over NATO grew, and pressure on trade negotiations led to the implosion of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The possibility of Trump’s re-election had prompted Europeans to look for new approaches to security, defence, and its trading relationship with China – until the resignation of incumbent president Joe Biden, and subsequent nomination of Harris, renewed the chance of a Democrat victory. Now European policymakers are becoming complacent: regardless of what 5 November brings, it is vital that the EU demonstrates a unified approach towards Washington. Establishing the EU-US Trade and Technology Council has already shown the potential for EU member states to achieve significant progress in advancing the bloc’s interest through collaboration. The new European Commission should apply this approach of bloc unity in other critical security areas such as NATO and the Ukraine conflict, with the aim of ensuring robust American engagement. The challenge is to ensure that all member states remain on the same page in sustaining the current level of American support for Ukraine, regardless of the US election outcome. If it does, the bloc will be irreplaceable when it comes to the security guarantees and securing Kyiv’s potential future NATO membership.

But the conflict in Ukraine remains a long-standing challenge for the EU and its other Western allies, with responsibility for the country’s future largely resting on their shoulders. An ongoing lack of funding and the EU’s hesitancy to fully commit to supporting Ukraine militarily and financially has hindered efforts to find a resolution to the conflict – or to even put the necessary pressure on Vladimir Putin to prevent further Russian escalation. This lack of action has led to the growing death toll of both civilians and military personnel, and compromised Ukraine’s ability to maintain its vital infrastructure supplies and resources, such as electricity power grids. The West needs to re-evaluate its approach to supporting Kyiv in order to prevent further catastrophic damage, with several options remaining open for the EU and Ukraine to decisively combat Russian aggression in the short-term: clearly, prolonging the current “muddling through” scenario is insufficient to force Russia to make concessions.

While the EU has already mobilised resources to train and equip Ukrainian forces and supporting European defence research, this effort must be bolder and more sustainable. In the long term, Western supporters should consider how their intervention could bring about conditions for a ceasefire agreement that prioritises Ukraine’s political stability, economic reconstruction, and security guarantees to deter further aggression by Russia. Through stronger Transatlantic integration (namely, NATO membership) and security partnerships, Western allies could offer Ukraine more reliable guarantees of sovereignty and prosperity, and create an opportunity for Kyiv to negotiate an end to the conflict under conditions that protect its interests and future stability. However, for this approach to be driven by Europe, both the European Commission and EU member states will have to define their roles in possible negotiations – and defend their decisions against a possibly hostile US administration.

Away from, but not excluding, the conflict in Ukraine, the new European Commission must also confirm the scope of European defence. This includes defining a clear budget, developing a new direction for cooperation, and creating tangible and achievable goals. EU member states are yet to agree to commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s pledge to commit €500 billion to defence over the next five-year term, with most ‘frugal states’ shifting towards more domestic defence spending for fear of Russia. But this is not new. The EU has long struggled to establish a unified defence policy, with member states often prioritising their own national interests over collective security. And, as Euroscepticism grows even among the most historically pro-EU member states, this issue will only get worse. To address growing regional security threats, of which Russian aggression is the pinnacle, the new commission should prioritise cooperation of its member states in establishing the EU as a serious actor in defence and security. This, in turn, would demonstrate to its member states that the bloc can develop a unified approach to combat external threats.

At the national level, various European countries have publics that are insular and focused on “defending their way of life”. They care about security and migration, energy prices and inflation, and demography and defence – but all in the context of their home country. This inward focus has resulted in the rise of both far-right and far-left populism in Europe, exemplified by parties such as the Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany, which both performed well in the country’s regional elections. Such parties often exploit nationalist sentiments and espouse anti-EU rhetoric to gain support, adept at turning foreign policy issues into domestic culture wars. It is therefore increasingly difficult for EU countries to maintain unity on key foreign policy issues, including Ukraine: now the bloc must resolve foreign policy problems not only to improve Europe’s global standing, but also to attempt to defeat the Eurosceptic narratives and demonstrate the power of a more unified EU.

Discussions over the next EU long-term budget, known as the Multiannual Financial Framework, have not begun, and the “Christmas tree” of European priorities may have outgrown its available resources. But to convince the world, and its own citizens, that it takes their concerns seriously, the EU must act on these immediate security challenges. The new commission needs to demonstrate that it can be proactive regarding its position on defence – including by creating a better starting position from which Ukraine can negotiate a durable peace, rather than witness a new Russia-led war in a couple of years’ time. The commission must also be prepared for less America in defence and security, regardless of which candidate wins the US election. Most importantly, it should reassure EU citizens that they are better protected within the union, rather than by the sovereign narratives of Eurosceptics. Now is the time for the EU to show that it can act.