It is over 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the start of the most intense fighting on the European continent since the end of the second world war. US president-elect Donald Trump has promised to end all of this within “24 hours”. But the trajectory of the conflict depends on the complex interplay of several factors. How the new US administration shapes these factors will play an important role in its attempt to bring the conflict to a halt – and could both help and hinder the Ukranian fight.  

• Western support for Ukraine. Western financial and military assistance has been crucial for Ukraine to resist almost three years of Russian aggresion. Yet Ukraine’s Western partners have also faced criticism for doing “enough not to lose, but not enough to win”. Analysts close to Trump’s team argue that military aid to Ukraine will continue if Kyiv is willing to start negotaitions, likely to reduce Putin’s leverage at the negotiating table. Trump may also seek closer involvement in defence production in Ukraine if it is profitable for US companies, or more likely, on US soil. 

• The Russian economy. The Russian war economy has proven relatively resilient. This is largely due to the considerable amount of reserve funds accumulated during the years of profitable oil and gas exports and sanctions circumvention. However, a recent round of US sanctions targeting Russia’s Gazprombank has injured the rouble, and new wounds may soon appear. The reserve funds are dwindling and the EU’s new energy commissioner plans to end all reliance on Russian gas before 2027. The Trump administration may permit increased export for new liquefied natural gas projects and oil drilling, potentially dropping global prices, further reducing the revenues for Russia’s budget. The new US president could also expand secondary sanctions (although this is far from confirmed).  

• The effectiveness of Russia’s subversive actions against the West. Russian propaganda, disinformation campaigns, hybrid warfare, and other KGB-style “active measures” sow doubt in Western policies, set large social groups in individual countries against each other, and disrupt the unity of Western alliances. Trump will not want to look weak or naïve in front of Putin, but his Republican ranks differ greatly on how to respond to such aggression. If his first term is anything to judge by, the US response is unlikely to be effective, especially as Trump’s record of talking soft on Vladimir Putin may undermine any gains in this regard.      

These factors (and others) could combine in a number of ways over the coming months and years. But they are likely to lead to one of four scenarios, as set out below. The scenarios are not intended to be predictions, but thought exercises to facilitate planning and coordination among Ukraine’s European partners. In all scenarios, the West would not recognise Russia’s rights over Crimea and the occupied territories in the four Ukrainian regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson), regardless of their inclusion in the Russian constitution.  

Scenario one: A “freeze” of the conflict with minor changes to the current line of contact 

Both the Russian and Ukrainian leaders are calling for peace. Yet there is no hint that they will abandon their aims, particularly given that “peace” is a highly contested concept. The Kremlin considers the Crimean Peninsula and four Ukrainian regions to be part of the Russian Federation, does not accept the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership, and seeks to establish a puppet regime in Kyiv. Ukraine aims to preserve its independence and sovereignty, restore its territorial integrity, and ensure a just and lasting peace. Both sides appear to believe that military means will enable them to better position themselves before a possible ceasefire agreement and negotiations over a “peace plan.” 

This scenario therefore seems unlikely in near-term. But, for instance, Trump could attempt to set the immediate termination of fighting as a condition for supporting Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership or a promise of significant investment in Ukraine’s recovery. If this were to combine with a relatively stable Russian economy, a general reduction in military aid for Ukraine, at least partial success in Russia’s subversive activities, and clear signs of fatigue in Ukrainian society, a frozen conflict of this nature could be on the table.  

The issue of security guarantees is key in this scenario. It is unlikely that NATO will soon reach a consensus to accept Ukraine into the alliance or, alternatively, that Trump will provide security guarantees for Ukraine similar to those for Japan and South Korea. The freeze in the conflict would therefore be unlikely to last for long, and hostilities could resume with Russia at an advantage, having recuperated its military capacities. 

Scenario two: A continued “war of attrition” with fighting of variable intensity 

The fighting will continue if Trump fails to convince Putin and Ukranian president Volodymyr Zelensky to accept any terms of a truce. But this scenario would also require the Russian economy to be strong enough to continue to support the military operations, Western military aid to Ukraine remaining substantial, and only partial success of Russia’s subversive activities against the West. Essentially, this is business as usual. 

Scenario three: Ukrainian “victory” in one to three years 

This scenario requires effective enforcement of sanctions and a weakened Russian economy. It will also require Ukraine’s Western partners to increase their military aid, as well as the minimisation of Russian influence in Western countries and alliances, and additional military mobilisation in Ukraine. The realisation of this scenario requires coordinated and consistent actions by the West.   

Scenario four: Russian “victory” 

A fourth “worst case” scenario – allowing Putin to achieve his goals in Ukraine – cannot be entirely excluded. This would involve the perfect storm of a reduction in Western military support, a partial lifting of US sanctions, and a general improvement in the Russian economy, as well as further Russian success in its subversion tactics in Western countries.  

Its realisation will deal a major blow not only to Ukraine and European security but also to the global security architecture. Ukraine’s European partners know that even partial Russian success in the war will undermine the global order. If Putin achieves his goals in Ukraine, even partially, Russia will intensify its subversive actions across the Western world, and military aggression against a European NATO member country cannot be ruled out. 

The European response 

As my ECFR collegues recently argued, Europeans must first determine their own goals when supporting Ukraine in the second Trump era. They then need to prepare for how their American ally will develop his own approach to Ukraine, how US policies will impact the course of the war, and the scenarios these could lead to.  

The goal of the 47^th president of the United States is clear – to end the war, but concrete policies are yet to be announced. Europeans must urgently formulate a common approach and actively seek alignment of views on NATO, European, and global security between the two sides of the north Atlantic. This includes increased defence spending, much closer coordination of the development of European defence capabilities, including development of the defence technological and industrial base, and a willingness to compensate for any reduction or delay in US military aid to Ukraine. Proposals for closer and more transparent interaction between the defence industries of Europe and the US need to be put forward. The defence spending target of 2 per cent of GDP is anachronistic. The new common target should be 2.5 per cent, possibly even 3 per cent of GDP. And, greater transparency of aid provided to Ukraine is needed, possibly through a financial metric such as a percentage of GDP, with increased European efforts to coordinate this aid. 

Between now and 20 January, Europeans and their Ukranian partners cannot be ready enough. But, by being proactive, European leaders can formulate a more ambitious defence policy and establish a common ground for tackling US involvement in European security, defence, and support to Ukraine.