The contours of President Donald Trump’s “unpeace” agreement with Vladimir Putin are becoming clear. US troops in Ukraine to monitor a ceasefire and Ukraine’s NATO membership are off the table; European deployments would not be covered by NATO’s mutual-defence clause; and Ukraine should forget about recovering Russian occupied territory. Washington is winding down its contributions to European security and instead seems to be eyeing a spheres-of-influence deal with Moscow.

While this might not be the exact outcome, worst-case scenario assumptions should guide Europeans’ defence planning. It is up to Europe to secure Ukraine and the continent against future Russian attacks. A European military presence in Ukraine is emerging as one piece of the post-war puzzle to back up a ceasefire.

But complex questions abound.[1] A secret cold war unit to ensure Allied access to West Berlin against Soviet interference holds some lessons for European leaders today.

The Live Oak experience

Strategically, West Berlin was unimportant to the east-west balance. With the Soviet blockade of the city and the subsequent Western airlift operation from 1948 to 1949, however, it had become a symbol of freedom and democracy—and a thorn in the side of Moscow’s empire in eastern Europe.

Repeated attempts by Soviet and East German troops to deny American, British and French convoys access to Berlin as guaranteed by the London protocols that delineated the post-war occupation zones culminated, in 1958, by an ultimatum from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. He demanded that the four occupation powers revise the status of Berlin and thereby remove the legal basis for the Western military presence.

Western leaders realised that they were ill-prepared for another blockade of Berlin. General Lauris Norstad, in his dual role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of US European Command (USEUCOM), proposed the creation of a tripartite staff to assess and align response options for future Soviet attempts to infringe upon the Western powers’ rights of access to Berlin. “Live Oak” commenced operations soon thereafter; the Berlin crisis of 1961 was its first major test.

Now, as Europeans grapple with the complexities of how to organise and operate a future European military presence in Ukraine, the Live Oak experience holds some lessons: on command and control, on contingency planning, and on communicating with partners and foe.

Applying Live Oak to Ukraine

Live Oak was set up as a tripartite staff outside of NATO structures because only America, Britain and France had guaranteed rights of access to Berlin. Norstad was appointed commander of Live Oak, leveraging the USEUCOM chain of command, and the unit relied on non-NATO communications gear. Yet, over time, it became clear that contingencies related to the three powers’ access to Berlin could escalate to affect NATO defence plans, requiring consultation with the other allies. Eventually, West Germany was invited to join the staff and the diplomatic formats overseeing Live Oak operations.

Similarly, a European military presence in Ukraine should be organised around a single command. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) could, in his role as a British four-star officer, take the lead; the British-led high-readiness Allied Rapid Reaction Corps could provide the headquarters infrastructure and communications. Later, a more permanent solution could be found—a European army of the Dnipro?

The staff make-up would represent the countries that contribute troops to the mission, as well as personnel from Ukraine (much like West Germany in Live Oak). DSACEUR would ensure that NATO is being informed and consulted where necessary, but the staff and mission would not depend upon consensus among all 32 allies.

Plans are nothing; planning is everything

A core purpose of Live Oak was to continuously develop, refine, and exercise contingency plans to test Soviet intentions when they infringed Western powers’ rights of access to Berlin by land and air. European troops would not have to cross Moscow-controlled territory or its proxies to get to Ukraine, but Russia will undoubtedly test European resolve. Moscow, even if it agrees to a European military presence in Ukraine as part of a ceasefire, will try to divide allies by targeting European troops in Ukraine; and European populations and leaders at home.

Command staff should consider how Russia could work to derail the mission and develop the appropriate response options for European troops and leaders.

On one level, these would ensure that Russian attempts to single out one European ally’s contingent would trigger a united response from all. During the cold war, Moscow frequently pointed to one Western power’s leniency on the issue of convoy inspections to demand the same from others as they crossed East German territory, for example. Accordingly, Europeans should develop standard operating procedures for dealing with Russian hybrid measures towards their troops in Ukraine.

On a second level, planning should produce options for leaders to respond to Russian-instigated crises horizontally: what military and non-military instruments could be used to demonstrate resolve in Ukraine by taking action outside of Ukraine? Live Oak considered flexibly reinforcing convoys and air probes to have larger, more militarily credible footprints; maritime countermeasures to restrict Soviet shipping and naval operations; and communications campaigns to inform and rally domestic and international audiences.

Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Europeans have similarly applied various military and non-military tools to respond to Russian aggression. These include military aid, economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures, which are often reactive, rather than pro-active. But this has worked for Europeans—with the US leading, the costs of delayed action or inaction have rarely come to bear on them.

Without US backing, they will have to be able to escalate crises in order to shape their course in Europe’s, and Ukraine’s, interest. Responding to Russian actions in Ukraine outside of the country could help to increase pressure on Moscow while avoiding a further risk increase for European troops in Ukraine.

Like West Berliners’ defiance in 1948, Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and beyond is a powerful symbol which has drawn Western support. Unlike West Berlin, a sovereign Ukraine is of strategic importance to the future balance of power between Europe and Russia. Military deployments by European countries to Ukraine are no doubt risky.

But in order to have any chance at preventing war with Russia, Europeans must unambiguously demonstrate that they are willing to risk one.

[1] Other works have previously discussed the purpose, size and composition of European military deployments to Ukraine. See Franz-Stefan Gady in Foreign Policy, Claudia Major and Aldo Kleemann for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), or Jack Watling and Michael Kofman in War on the Rocks for such analysis.