As the tussle for the European Union’s top jobs continues into September, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni has made a conciliatory choice for commissioner. Rome nominated Raffaele Fitto, the current minister for European affairs, a member of her Brothers of Italy party, and a former member of the European People’s Party (EPP). Fitto is a moderate political figure who still maintains good relations with his centrist colleagues. The appointment is likely an attempt to smooth things over with Ursula von der Leyen after Meloni abstained from voting for her as president of the European Commission and Meloni’s party had voted against her back in July. But as the EU faces mounting global challenges, it is up to von der Leyen to take the high ground and make sure Rome is still on side.

Since coming to power on a far-right platform, Meloni has assumed an opaque position within European politics. Initially seen as a potential bridge between traditional European political forces and rising nationalist movements, she has attempted to balance her ideological roots with a more centrist posture on the European stage. This has brought Meloni a more credible and pragmatic reputation in Brussels, especially on foreign policy dossiers such as supporting Ukraine or abandoning a pro-China policy. Her recent playbook, however, has demonstrated her disappointment with the political direction the EU has taken since the European parliament election. In response, her declared ambition was to create an alternative majority in the European parliament that would replicate the Italian model (an alliance between right-wingers and centrists).

This approach has backfired. Von der Leyen’s choice to seek a deal with the Greens party meant the political alternative Meloni was offering was no longer needed. Now, as decision makers return to Brussels, the Italian prime minister finds herself in a significantly weakened position. Her snubbing of von der Leyen over the summer and the subsequent souring of their relationship risks putting Italy – and the EU – in a difficult position.

Italy cannot afford to isolate itself at a time when the country needs stronger European cooperation: in the coming weeks, the Italian government requires the commission to approve its budget plan for the next five years. On top of this, weaker Rome-Brussels cooperation risks marginalising the country in EU decision-making processes, limiting the country’s ability to effectively tackle foreign policy challenges. For example, migration – one of the most important issues for Rome – requires EU support and coordination, as does Italy’s Mattei plan for greater African cooperation and the new India-Middle East-Corridor project (which both Meloni and von der Leyen seem to be heavily banking on as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative).

More significantly, however, the EU needs Italy to maintain its foreign policy capabilities. European industrial policy, its position toward China, support for Ukraine, as well as policy towards the Mediterranean, Africa, and India requires a common European position and a major Italian contribution. In North Africa and the Sahel, for example, Rome remains one of the few European players with an active role after a wave of anti-French sentiment has limited Paris’s room for manoeuvre and Germany has only briefly committed its political and military resources to the region.

The Italian government is also influential on Ukraine. Recently, Rome opposed the use of European weapons provided to Kyiv for anything beyond defensive purposes. This move was dictated by domestic political reasons (mostly cautious and pacifist Italian public opinion), but it is nothing that more negotiation between von der Leyen and Meloni can’t fix. For example, the commission could convince Italy to reverse its decision in exchange for guaranteeing Fitto a prominent commission role or by delaying the deadline on using the NextGenerationEU funds.

Going forward, the ball is in von der Leyen’s court. She could punish and isolate Italy further or extend an olive branch. In June, the French president and German chancellor among others called for excluding Meloni’s party from the majority in the European parliament. They may now be tempted to extend a cordon sanitaire to Meloni, as has been done with populist and pro-Russian forces such as France’s National Rally party. The Greens and liberals, for example, already seem to have problems with Fitto’s nomination. Others, such as EPP president Manfred Weber, who has unsuccessfully tried in the past to bring Meloni inside the centrist arena, are more in favour of opening up to the Italian government and giving Italian commissioner Fitto an important portfolio (the Meloni government is asking for an executive vice-presidency with important economic delegations).  

It would be counterproductive for von der Leyen to adopt a punitive attitude and corner Meloni. This would only push Italy even further to the right and away from cooperation with the Brussels. It is difficult to think that just when European foreign policy needs to be strong, the EU can only count on the Paris-Berlin axis, especially when these two countries are so domestically precarious.

Rather, Italy’s request for the vice-presidency with an economic portfolio should be welcomed (as von der Leyen appears likely to do). It may well co-opt the Italian government to become more integrated into the heart of Europe. At the same time, dishing out more responsibility often makes one more responsible. Even though it would be quite surreal for the control of NextGenerationEU funds to be given to the country that receives the most and is currently asking for a change in the funds’ deadline, von der Leyen has limited options.

Nevertheless, Meloni has demonstrated the limits of her pragmatism. By voting against von der Leyen, she seems to be betting on a potential return of Donald Trump to the White House, which would allow her ideology to regain centrality in the EU. This is a risky choice. If Kamala Harris wins, it is likely that Meloni will have to continue, perhaps unwillingly, her convergence towards the centre. If Trump wins, she will be emboldened to opt for more populist policies and to act as a bridge between the United States and the EU. This is therefore all the more reason for von der Leyen to pull Italy back on side before Meloni’s ally across the Atlantic has the chance to encourage her in the other direction.