German state elections typically revolve around matters such as immigration and social security. But the recent elections in Thuringia and Saxony in the country’s east have proved foreign policy positioning to be just as effective for winning votes. In Thuringia, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in well ahead of the Christian Democrats (CDU), and in Saxony it was a close second. The socialist and culturally conservative Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) – only founded in January this year – came third in both states, winning more votes combined than the parties of the governing “traffic-light” coalition. It will be near impossible to form a government in either state without the participation of the AfD or the BSW. The AfD is likely to remain in opposition due to a lack of willing coalition partners, but the BSW could soon enter government in both states. Both parties are expected to achieve similarly strong results in the Brandenburg state elections on 22 September.

Both parties’ rise could seriously impact on Germany’s foreign policy debate. Whether in government or opposition, elevation of AfD and BSW rhetoric risks shifting Germany’s Overton window towards anti-Western policies. Just as the country gets ready to elect a new federal parliament next year, centrist parties may feel pressured by the rising popularity of populist foreign policy to adopt some of its elements or risk a slump in support.

The AfD’s and the BSW’s local election campaigns saw their policies of an end to military support for Ukraine, a rapprochement with Russia, and opposition to the stationing of American long-range weapons systems in Germany become topics of discussion in market squares from Erfurt to Weimar. By taking these stances, both parties are aiming to use foreign policy as part of their rupture with the “elite” which they claim governs without considering the interests of the normal, sensible citizen. “WAR or PEACE? You have the choice NOW!” read BSW campaign posters, suggesting that it is up to the voters in Thuringia and Saxony to end the war against Ukraine. True, the east is not representative of Germany as a whole. Surveys show that eastern Germans are generally much more sceptical towards the United States and NATO, and support for Ukraine is less pronounced than among their western counterparts. Slogans such as “Peace is everything” (AfD) or “Give peace a home again” (BSW) fall on more fertile ground in the east, where opponents of sending arms to Ukraine are in the majority. But feelings of insecurity and concerns about getting involved in a military conflict are growing in the west too, where doubts are rising over the need to strengthen the German armed forces. Similarly, the success of the AfD is not limited to the east. It became the second largest party in June’s European Parliament election, after the CDU, and is consistently polling in second place for the 2025 federal election. This growing sentiment has increased pressure on the traffic-light coalition to justify its Zeitenwende, or turning point, policy of bolstering the German army in response to Russian aggression.

Permanently higher defence spending to maintain NATO’s 2 per cent target, long-term military support for Ukraine at least at the current level, and a stronger leadership role for Germany in European defence are unintuitive stances to many Germans, despite Russia’s war of aggression. This is particularly true in light of Germany’s dire budgetary situation in which more money for defence inevitably means less money for something else. Parts of the Social Democratic Party in particular, which sees itself as a peace party in the tradition of former chancellor Willy Brandt, find it hard to believe that the loudest calls for “diplomacy” are now coming from the fringes – while the current chancellor praises the planned stationing of American long-range weapons systems in Germany.

But the challenge for Germany’s foreign-policy establishment goes even deeper. The AfD and the BSW are not just calling for a counter-Zeitenwende that questions the new direction Berlin has taken. They want to reposition Germany in Europe and the world. The AfD has consistently criticised Germany’s Western orientation. Instead, the party has positioned itself as a defender of national sovereignty. In its 2021 strategy paper “Realpolitik in the German Interest”, the party advocated that Germany should take on a “special bridging and mediating role to the Russian-Asian region” – a stance that has remained unchanged since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In fact, this position was further amplified in the AfD’s 2024 European election manifesto, where the party calls for Germany to seek observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expand relations with the Eurasian Economic Union. At an AfD congress in 2023, the party’s leader Tino Chrupalla called for Europe to stop being “an appendage of the West”. The AfD views the European Union as an “unreformable and failed project” and its admiration for Brexit as a model for Germany illustrates its broader agenda to replace the EU with a “union of European nations”. Meanwhile, the BSW’s platform in Thuringia and Saxony called for immediate peace negotiations with Ukraine, condemned economic sanctions against Russia, warned of increasing German militarisation, and opposed the stationing of a German brigade in Lithuania. At the same time, the BSW echoes AfD rhetoric on transatlantic relations with the party’s leader, Sarah Wagenknecht, referring to Olaf Scholz as an American “vassal chancellor”. The BSW also aligns with the AfD on its perception of the EU, arguing that the bloc “ in its current constitution harms the European idea”.

The AfD’s and the BSW’s overlapping agendas underscore a shared goal: reversing Germany’s post-war trajectory by moving away from European integration, away from the US, and towards a more nationalist stance. Their anti-Western rhetoric extends beyond Germany’s borders, resonating with populists across Europe who argue that the true destabilising force in the region is the US, not Russia.

The BSW went as far as to promise its voters that it would only join a state government if it was in favour of immediate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and against the stationing of US weapons systems in west Germany – even if these decisions do not fall within the competence of the state. This puts its potential coalition partner, the CDU, in a difficult position. Meeting the BSW’s demands would force the CDU to abandon the basic principles of its foreign policy. Even if only at the state level, concessions by the CDU on this issue would raise massive doubts at home and abroad about Germany’s reliability as an ally.

As Germany faces foreign policy challenges not seen since the end of the cold war, it is not enough for centrist parties to label the AfD and the BSW as “Putin parties” (even if there are definitely indications of Russian influence) and otherwise be complacent. The recent success of the AfD and the BSW owes to many Germanys being receptive to their disruptive agendas. Centrist parties should be aware that support for the transatlantic partnership and European integration cannot be taken for granted and that the necessity for higher defence spending, a more capable army, and a policy towards Russia that focuses on deterrence need to be well argued.

The global Zeitenwende is testing many of Germany’s foreign policy certainties. The AfD’s and the BSW’s foreign policy populism should force the establishment to make a better case for the added value of alliances such as NATO and the EU that are essential to maintain the security and prosperity of German citizens. Berlin’s foreign policy needs a new social consensus. All centrist parties, from the Greens to the CDU and the Christian Social Union, would do well not to leave the debate to the extremist fringes but reclaim it for the centre.