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On Sunday, representatives from around the world will gather for the United Nation’s grandly named Summit of the Future, first proposed by secretary-general António Guterres in 2021. The aim is clear: to modernise the multilateral system in response to new threats such as climate change and pandemics, as well as the shift in the global balance of power since the UN was established in 1945. Guterres’ logic is sound – international cooperation needs reform. But despite its lofty goals, great power disagreements and fundamental differences between the richest countries and the developing world mean the summit will fail to achieve ground-breaking advances – countries are simply too far apart to agree on any radical changes.
The main product to be agreed upon is a “Pact for the Future”, which has been under negotiation for eight months, with Germany and Namibia steering the discussions. European officials involved in the process insist that the text will be valuable as a reaffirmation of countries’ commitment to working together and will outline some helpful principles to guide future cooperation.[1] But so far, the process has mainly confirmed the extent of international divisions and that the huge gulf in trust between the global north and south remains.
However, the negotiations do suggest most countries remain committed to multilateralism, even if they disagree on its direction. In particular, the global south will press the north at the summit for rebalanced partnerships that give them greater influence and agency. In light of the United States’ declining interest in multilateralism – which could be greatly sped up come November – the European Union and its member states should step up to the plate and win back some trust.
To do so, Europeans will have to respond to claims that they have not yet done enough to fulfil their promises of allocating more money towards climate adaption and meeting development goals, offering greater inclusivity in international financial institutions, and showing more openness to financial discussions involving more of the global south. Indeed, European leaders have spoken often about the importance of bridging the north-south divide, but have continued to oppose measures such as giving the UN a role in global taxation and not shown any willingness to reconsider Europe’s traditional leadership role at the IMF. Negotiations over a proposed new pandemic treaty have also seen European countries oppose calls for binding commitments to share vaccines and other countermeasures in medical emergencies.
To build on their slow progress, European governments should use the opportunity to fill in the gaps of the summit’s vague and ambitious commitments by forging new partnerships with the global south that advances their shared interests.
The Pact for the Future should at least provide some pointers on which issues world leaders see as the most fruitful for cooperation and which are controversial. The pact is divided into five sections that represent a compromise between the kinds of forward-looking global challenges that Guterres hoped the summit would focus on and the pressing concerns of member states. Among the forward-looking areas are chapters on science, technology, and digital cooperation; on youth and future generations; and on reforming global governance. Now in its fourth revision, states are still fighting over its language just days before the summit.
On technology and future generations, the pact is far from achieving radical change. Rather, officials say the pact is mainly a marker of the issues which should receive more attention in multilateral forums. In the area of global governance, however, diplomats have surprised themselves and observers by making some headway on principles for reforming the Security Council, even if the most difficult questions about vetoes and how new permanent members are chosen remain unaddressed.
The most contentious areas of the negotiations have been about development (including questions about reforming the governance of international financial institutions) and peace and security. Russia has fought hard to remove condemnation of aggression from the text, as well as to tone down language encouraging nuclear disarmament (a position that other nuclear states have also adopted, if less vociferously). Language about phasing out fossil fuels and on human rights, particularly concerning gender rights, has also been the subject of intense debate.
Above all, most countries from the global south, organised in the G77 group, have fought for strong commitments to support an increase in funding to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and to support climate adaptation; to give the UN a greater role on international financial issues; and to give developing countries and emerging economies more influence in the decision-making processes of the World Bank and IMF. Officials involved in the negotiations say it remains uncertain how divisions over countries’ representation and inclusion in international financial decision-making will be bridged.[2]
Most observers expect that compromises will eventually be found in all these areas. But, as European officials themselves acknowledge; the text of the pact will only represent a step forward if countries act on the language it contains.[3] The precise contours of a reimagined European relationship with the global south are open to debate and major reforms to international financial institutions would demand American backing. However, it will require steps towards scaling up development finance, bringing global south countries into decision-making processes more closely, and accelerating the transfer of technology and know-how to the developing world. A more detailed and convincing set of policies in these areas will be needed if Europeans’ language on the importance of multilateralism and of resetting relations with the developing world is to be believed.
[1] Author’s conversation with European officials, Berlin, Germany, 12 September 2024.
[2] Author’s discussions with European officials, 12 September 2024.
[3] Author’s discussions with European officials, 12 September 2024.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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