Given the rhetoric and actions of Ankara over the last decade, it is hardly surprising that Turkey has finally decided to formally apply for a BRICS membership. The economic bloc, founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, is now seen as a shorthand for non-Western powers seeking an alternative to the Western-led geopolitical order, especially with regard to global trade. In 2024, BRICS expanded its membership to include countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. But the addition of Turkey means it would be the only NATO member in a league led by Russia and China – with an agenda dominated by the authoritarian regimes.

This is a big deal. Should Turkey’s bid succeed, it would benefit the country’s ongoing quest to develop an independent foreign policy which often diverges from its transatlantic allies. But Turkey’s drift from the West is nothing new. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey is entrenched in a post-Western narrative which has shaped his political identity for at least a decade. The idea of the West as in decline is now firmly rooted across the Turkish political spectrum and Turkey’s current political leaders believe that strategic autonomy is the ticket to a greater role on world stage.

Although BRICS produces 36-37 per cent of global GDP, the European Union remains Turkey’s main partner for trade and investment, and its main export market – in this arena, BRICS’ relationship with Turkey lags behind. But the Turkish reasoning for joining BRICS seems to be that, in addition to building trade opportunities, membership could make Ankara’s Western allies pay more attention to its domestic needs. At the very least, Ankara hopes they will soften their policy of cold-shouldering the Turkish capital.

It is evident that Turkey wants to retain its Western anchor; but also the flexibility to have a foot in each camp. Much like his illiberal counterparts in Serbia, Hungary, and the Gulf Arab monarchies, Erdogan views geopolitics as a constant hedging among great powers. He is skilfully playing off Russia against the West, using both the advantages of NATO membership and his personal rapport with Vladimir Putin to expand Turkey’s economic gains. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has allowed Ankara to take this to a new level: Turkey is doubling down on its trade and energy relationship with Moscow while also supporting Ukraine through arms sales, defence industry partnerships – and restricting the Russian navy’s access to the Black Sea.

BRICS is clearly one more instrument in this balancing act. Membership would allow Turkey to consolidate its economic gains in the global south, including central Asia and in Africa, where it has emerged as a serious economic player. Turkey also wants to cultivate a stronger trade relationship with China, to whom it has recently made overtures. Foreign minister Hakan Fidan’s recent visit to Beijing, the first by a high-level Turkish diplomatic representative in 12 years, was followed by an announcement that China’s leading electric-car maker, BYD, was ready to invest $1bn in a new plant in Turkey. 

Now the real question is how Europe and the US should respond to Turkey’s new geopolitical move. It remains to be seen whether Turkey’s Western allies will continue to ignore Ankara’s geopolitical drift; or if they will draw a firm line which says BRICS membership is incongruous with Turkey’s prior commitments to Western institutions.

First, Europeans and Americans should stop rolling their eyes and yawning when they hear the word “BRICS.” While the organisation does not have muscle now – BRICS has no peacekeeping force, financial system, or even common foreign policy – this could change in the future. On an ideological level, its members seem united in their belief that the West is steeped in hypocrisy, especially regarding Gaza; has overstayed its welcome as the head of global power; and, for autocracies like China and Russia, that the Western-led democratic model does not necessarily solve everyone’s problems.

Second, and more importantly, European countries and the United States should consider the type of relationship they want with Turkey. An actual BRICS membership would complicate Ankara’s institutional ties with NATO and the EU. But Ankara ‘dangling’ the idea of BRICS to get the West’s attention should provide opportunities for a re-think, and perhaps re-engagement, on the West and Turkey’s relationship. “If our economic integration with the EU had been crowned with membership, perhaps we would not be in such a quest,” said Fidan recently.

Currently, on account of Turkey’s democratic deficit and Europe’s enlargement fatigue, Turkey’s ascension to the EU is a pipe dream. But establishing a more stable and mutually rewarding relationship that complements Europe’s own goals of strategic autonomy and sustainable competitiveness is not. Simply put: better relations with Turkey is in the geoeconomic interests of Europe and the strategic interests of Washington. If Turkey had a better relationship with the West, it would be less tempted by BRICS membership.

Turkey could also play a role in helping establish a post-Ukraine-war European security environment. For example, it might aid with developing the future of European defence, and in bolstering Europe’s industrial policy to reduce dependence on China – Turkey’s sizeable manufacturing base could benefit the EU. But Washington and Brussels should also start engaging with Turkey on its demands for reform in institutions of global governance, including the UN, and address concerns about Western double standards in international norms with regard to the current war in Gaza. Most importantly, Europe and the US need to identify ways to find stability with Turkey and decide where it aligns with Europe’s quest for greater geopolitical autonomy: and trade is a good place to start. Turkey’s trade relationship with BRICS is growing, while its long-standing economic relationship with Europe is stable. Turkey and the EU have long toyed with the idea of modernising their 1995 customs union agreement, which would allow Turkish businesses to have greater exposure to European markets while re-building Europe’s economic and political leverage across Turkey’s complicated political map.

As a bloc, BRICS represents a shift in global south attitudes from accepting a Western-led liberal hegemony to establishing an as-yet-undiscovered new order. Turkey’s desire for BRICS membership – whether intended to spook the West or for Turkey to establish greater economic opportunities – is a symptom of changing global currents. It legitimises the global south’s search for a new order and perpetuates the notion that the West is in terminal decline. It should be a warning signal that Turkey, a long-time NATO ally and one-time poster child of Europe’s transformative power through enlargement, is open to alternative ideas.

As it stands, Turkey’s BRICS membership application will be considered at the upcoming meeting in Kazan on 22 October, where both Erdogan and Putin will be in attendance. If it goes ahead, this will be a major coup for Russia and China – but it is not necessarily a loss for the West, assuming it can reconfigure its relationship with Turkey. This is the gamble on which Erdogan is counting.