Donald Trump will start his second presidency facing a devastated Middle East: catastrophic wars in Gaza and Lebanon between Israel and Iranian-backed groups risk provoking a wider conflict between the Israel and Iran even before Trump takes office in January. Over the past year, Israel and Iran have engaged in two unprecedented rounds of direct military attacks against one another. They are now braced for a third round of strikes – with Tehran promising a “teeth-breaking response” to Israel’s 26 October strikes on Iranian military sites. While Trump’s victory has given some pause to both sides regarding their next move, Israel and Iran will likely try to establish an advantage on the ground before his presidency. In doing so, they risk overreaching and plunging the region further into war.

While the incoming president has vowed to bring peace to the region and to extract the US from military entanglements, a full-blown war between Iran and Israel could draw American troops into a direct confrontation. Europeans should urgently partner with Arab Gulf states to prevent this outcome, highlighting Israel’s dangerous illusion of militarily reshaping the region and pressing the Trump team to help put the brakes on escalatory dynamics before it is too late.

Netanyahu’s big vision

Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s aim to “change” the Middle East reflects the intensifying Israeli hubris following significant tactical gains against Iran and its partners in Gaza and Lebanon since the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023. Heavy Israeli military strikes have significantly undermined Iran’s network of regional allies – known as the “axis of resistance” – and exposed Iran’s inability to deter attacks.

Israel now senses the weakness of Iranian deterrence, borne in part by Tehran’s reluctance to be drawn into a full-blown conflict against Israel, and by extension the US. Its successful targeting of critical Iranian air defence systems, including the reported destruction of Russian made s-300 missile systems, in its last round of direct attacks offer a rare opening to hit Iran’s nuclear programme. While Israel knows it cannot destroy Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, it could temporarily set the programme back, while doing significant damage to Iranian military and economic structures. 

Having built up military momentum, Netanyahu likely sees both risk and opportunity following the US elections. Trump and his avidly pro-Israel advisors will undoubtedly back the country’s war aims. Yet Trump also campaigned on a platform of endings wars and has reportedly told Israel to wrap up the fighting by the time he assumes office. The period before Trump’s inauguration could therefore be a critical moment as Israel seeks to maximise its military gains against Iran and Hizbullah before Trump calls time out – or to engineer a situation in which Trump is forced to back intervention on Israel’s behalf.

Netanyahu may ultimately see the current period as an opportunity to lock the incoming US administration into direct military action against Iran even if Trump is keen to avoid this outcome. Given the Biden administration’s inertia over the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu may bet that the US could be compelled to support an expanding military campaign against Iran given the political pressure that Washington will face domestically to stay closely aligned with Israel – especially if this can be justified as self-defence against Iranian attacks. Trump’s reticence to be drawn into a regional war could be overwhelmed by the deep pro-Israeli and anti-Iranian positions of his inner circle which is already doubling down in calling for renewed maximum pressure against Tehran. Trump may also be persuaded that supporting Israel in a fight against Iran will allow him to cement a position of strength from which to negotiate an eventual deal with Tehran, an outcome he still claims to seek.

Tehran’s tricky calculus

Much depends on Iran’s response to Israel’s 26 October strikes. Its new reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has suggested that Tehran could moderate its upcoming attacks if there is a ceasefire in Lebanon. But this remains a long shot. While Biden, freed of US electoral pressure, could finally deploy some US leverage to press Israel towards a ceasefire, this may be too little too late given Trump’s imminent return and Israel’s maximalist demands.

Tehran has sent some signals that it would be prepared to de-escalate with the incoming administration – which would no doubt have a cooling impact on the Israeli-Iran front too. Javad Zarif, who is now an advisor to Pezeshkian, put out a statement on X noting his hope that Trump will “stand against war as pledged”. Pezeshkian also commented this week that Iran “will have to deal with the US…so it is better to manage this relation ourselves”, suggesting Iran could be open to direct diplomacy with the US. Iran has also taken a more conciliatory tone on its nuclear programme ahead of a meeting this week in Tehran with the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. A positive visit and signs of possible wider progress could soften Trump’s approach towards Tehran given his recent statement that he is not seeking regime change but rather focused on a nuclear weapons free Iran.

If, however, Iran’s security establishment concludes the 26 October Israeli attacks are the first phase of a more comprehensive Israeli strike plan, Tehran will likely hit back hard in the hope of deterring further action. The looming prospect of a Trump presidency could also provoke a sense of urgency in Tehran to lay down its own terms of engagement and firmly establish red lines against future Israeli attacks. If Trump’s policies in the region are determined by Iran hawks that are set to be in his cabinet, Tehran will likely aim to restore the balance of deterrence with its adversaries before the arrival of a more gung-ho US president.

Tehran’s calibrated responses to date, aimed at avoiding being sucked into a deeper war, may been seen as weakness in Israel, but should not be confused with an inability to impose greater damage if it feels more existentially challenged. While Iran and its allies are weakened, they retain the capacity to strike Israel, including the ability to overwhelm Israel’s missiles defence system. Meanwhile, other key members of the axis of resistance, including the Houthis and Hashed in Iraq, are reportedly mobilising for the possibility of a wider conflict.

What should be done

Even after the horrors of the past year, the risks of an even more extensive conflict between Israel and Iran should instil considerable concern in Europe. It could also trigger Iran to weaponise its highly advanced nuclear programme and deepen its military ties with Russia, both of which run counter to long-term European goals.

European governments should not buy into Israel’s illusion that it can remake the Middle East through military power and should be extremely worried at the prospect of a devastating wider war that could suck the US and its European allies into direct involvement. They need to act quickly to prevent this conflict, recognising that the greatest danger may lie in the lame duck period of Biden’s presidency, as both Iran and Israel will likely try to tilt the balance of power before Trump assumes office.

Given Biden’s clear weakness, Trump is now – even before he is inaugurated – perhaps the only person who can pressure Israel to hold back before it is too late. Trump can simultaneously signal to Tehran that its desire to move towards deal-making and economic relief rather than deeper conflict and renewed US maximum pressure depends on de-escalation, including not responding to Israel’s 26 October strikes.

A key pathway for Europeans to influence Trump towards this approach will be cooperation with Arab capitals. There has been an important rapprochement between Arab Gulf states and Tehran since Trump’s first term in office. Arab capitals now view a potential return to US maximum pressure policies with considerable concern given that this is likely to accelerate the prospect of an Israeli-Iranian war. A coalition of European and Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, should clearly communicate to Trump that this scenario risks locking the US into greater conflict.

European states should also be working with the Arab Gulf states which have strong influence in Tehran to directly make this case to Iran. The direct communication channel that Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Muhammad bin Salman now has to both Trump and Pezeshkian could be key in this endeavour.

Clearly, however, Trump’s unpredictability – combined with Netanyahu’s zeal for military victory and Iran’s determination to re-establish deterrence – means that Europeans need to also prepare for a very dangerous period ahead. Given the costly failures of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Western capitals have rightly sought to avoid a devastating war with Iran. The horrific situation in Gaza and Lebanon serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly conflicts in the Middle East can spiral and potentially draw the West into direct involvement. The West must now do all it can to prevent an expanding war between Iran and Israel.