North Korean troops in Russia. Chinese cars on European roads. Japan’s and South Korea’s presence at NATO gatherings. India’s slow but steady turn towards the West.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific are no longer neatly distinguishable political and military regions – they are strategically intertwined. In recent years, Europeans and their Asian partners have increasingly recognised the nature of the powerful interconnections linking their economies, societies, and security environments. They have begun to work more closely together, from sanctions on Russia, strengthened defence ties, and intensified diplomatic activity.

But the new American administration could bust apart this burgeoning relationship. President-elect Donald Trump’s willingness to undercut or even break off traditional alliances may tempt partners in both Europe and Asia to aim for bilateral deals rather than nurture a collective approach. Pressed on the matter of security concerns from China and Russia alike, they could feel forced to fall in behind whatever Washington wants to safeguard US security guarantees.

The solution, however, is for Europeans to do much more, not less, with their core Asian partners – from promoting defence readiness in both Europe and Asia; to maintaining economic and industrial relations; and remaining focused on the climate challenge. To make a success of such ambitious diplomacy, European policymakers need to understand the fears and hopes their counterparts in Japan, South Korea, and India are likely to see in Trump’s America.

Japan

What Tokyo wants

Rising geopolitical tensions in Japan’s neighbourhood mean the country is seeking additional collective security mechanisms with the United States to provide it with greater protection from potential Chinese aggression. New prime minister Shigeru Ishiba wants to consolidate the bilateral security alliance with America. After Trump’s election, Japan was quick to reiterate its commitment to cooperation with the US. Tokyo and Washington are already more intertwined than ever, especially in areas such as command and control and defence industrial production. 

What Trump’s return means

The first Trump administration’s dismissive attitude towards the traditional US defence commitments led the Japanese leadership to strengthen alliances with other regional powers such as Australia and the Philippines and increase outreach to NATO partners. Japan is likely to pursue this approach with even greater vigour now. But Tokyo will still want to maintain American support and will thus be eager to show it is a useful partner to the US in the region. This demonstrates Japan’s limited autonomy in its foreign policy. 

A Trump presidency will further intensify pressure on Japan’s export-driven economy, particularly in key sectors like car-making, semiconductors, and batteries. Higher American tariffs on Japanese goods would raise costs in already fiercely competitive markets and significantly disrupt Japan’s automotive industry in the US. Japan may also face indirect economic challenges from escalating US-China trade tensions, as its economy plays a major role in Chinese supply chains, with China still being Japan’s biggest trading partner. To avoid tariffs and align with US reshoring goals, Japan will likely expand US-based production in key sectors.

What Europeans should do now

Japan’s recent general election has resulted in a weakened ruling coalition and a prime minister lacking a majority. This will hinder Japanese efforts to nimbly adjust its foreign policy or maintain strategic independence, such as through swiftly implementing any countermeasures to unwelcome US decisions. In contrast, under prime minister Shinzo Abe during the first Trump administration, Tokyo excelled at quietly shaping priorities in Washington. Today, the Japanese government looks set to be more reactive and introspective all while coming under greater pressure to deliver on American demands. 

Europe should offer itself as a supportive partner, cognisant of the domestic political instability Japan decision-makers are currently operating in. More specifically, the EU should beef up its strategic partnership with Japan by homing in on shared interests and helping Japan to build up security cooperation with South Korea and Australia. The bloc should also pursue robust economic dialogue with ASEAN countries, which can play an important role in Japan’s and Europe’s de-risking agenda at the same time. It should back active participation by Japan in international forums such as the G7 and NATO. This would help Tokyo strengthen its strategic input without overstretching its domestic capacity or alliance with Washington.

On the economic front, Europe should deepen existing frameworks such as the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and accelerate initiatives such as the Digital Partnership. In addition, key European states such as Germany, France, and Italy should resume economic “2+2” meetings and hold them more regularly – at least twice a year, following the example of the United Kingdom’s planned approach.

South Korea

What Seoul wants

With its 28,500 troops in South Korea and nuclear umbrella guarantee, the US has been South Korea’s most important ally since the Korean war. Strengthening this alliance further has been the cornerstone of South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeoul’s foreign policy since his inauguration in 2022. He has placed a special focus on fortifying the US commitment to nuclear deterrence as well as providing Korea with more decision-making power in joint forces command matters. With US support, Yoon has also rapidly improved his country’s historically strained ties with Japan, along with trilateral relations. What Korea wants is to strengthen its bond with the US, invigorating Washington’s commitment to its presence on the peninsula, all while staying on good terms with China, its powerful neighbour and most important trading partner.

What Trump’s return means

Trump’s belligerent rhetoric and transactional view of diplomacy is set to put Yoon’s US-centric foreign policy to the test. It is more than possible that Trump could call for the renegotiation of a cost-sharing deal that the US and South Korea signed just this month. Besides asking for more money, other demands could include more Korean investments in the US, especially in strategic sectors such as semiconductors and AI, as well as a faster adoption of export controls and other economic security measures against China. This pressure to align more closely with US policy, to the backdrop of potential US threats to partially or fully withdraw from the peninsula, will put into question Seoul’s traditional diplomatic strategy of remaining on good terms with both the US and China.

The fear of waning US commitment could fuel existing domestic debates over whether to start an indigenous nuclear weapons programme to deter the North Korean threat independently of the US. Should Trump push for renewed diplomatic talks between the US and North Korea, Seoul is at risk of being completely sidelined in negotiations, given its rock-bottom relations with Pyongyang.

Trump’s transactional style of diplomacy could just as easily drive a renewed wedge between Seoul and Tokyo – just as much as it might persuade their near-neighbours to pursue even closer relations to hedge against US uncertainty – even though the weakness of Japan’s political leadership will make decisive breakthroughs in the Japanese-Korean relationship more difficult.

What Europeans should do now

In the face of uncertain US commitment, Europeans should continue to present themselves as strong, reliable partners to Seoul for tackling challenges that stretch across their respective regions. With Europeans now looking to invest even more in military capabilities since Trump’s re-election, Korea’s potent defence industry could complement an enhanced defence industrial strategy in the European Union. Europeans should also continue to probe Seoul about directly delivering weapons to Ukraine. On the economic front, South Korea and the EU, facing a lot of the same pressures from the US-China competition, can expand cooperation in economic security matters such as supply chain resilience and economic diversification. In all this, the EU should explore the possibility of setting up a trilateral format together with Japan, which shares most of these concerns.  

India

What New Delhi wants

Under prime minister Narendra Modi, India wants to continue its excellent recent relations with the US, which is now its most important international partner. This strengthening of Indo-US ties has continued over recent decades under both Democrat and Republican presidents, helping New Delhi use the relationship with Washington to soothe some of its anxiety about Beijing. In particular, India wants the US and its Western partners to provide it with cutting-edge technology to help its economic development. It also wants US companies to relocate their supply chains to India, moving them away from China if need be, to develop its manufacturing capability. Finally, India seeks a stronger military that is less dependent on Russia given growing Russia-China ties. It thus wants the US to transfer weapons technologies and defence manufacturing facilities.

What Trump’s return means

From the outside, few countries will seem as content with Trump’s victory as India. Modi publicly congratulated Trump as a “friend”. The two men share a personal and ideological affinity, while Trump inherits a US-India bilateral relationship which has rarely been stronger.

However, India-US trade has grown in recent years, and India continues to have a significant trade surplus. Even beyond this, New Delhi’s historically protectionist approach to trade and the domestic economy is seen as problematic by some of Trump’s most important advisers, including former US trade representative Robert Lighthizer. Like Europe, therefore, India risks being on the receiving end of tariffs in sectors such as pharmaceuticals. Trump has also previously attacked India for its own use of tariffs and trade restrictions against American companies.

A hawkish Trump administration will be sensitive too to any indication of warming relations between India and China. It will also want to ensure the US continues to get its money’s worth from India’s new role as an increasingly important partner of the West. India recently struck a long-awaited but incremental deal with China over the two countries’ contested Himalayan border. Beijing is already challenging the parameters of this deal, meaning the agreement’s significance should not be overstated; it is unlikely to be a prelude to greater strengthening in Sino-Indian ties, which have been poor since 2020. Rather than expending diplomatic energy with China, where chances of success are slim and potential rewards small, India is more likely to focus on getting the best possible deal from Trump.

What Europeans should do now

That said, just as it has sought better relations with the US, India has also built stronger ties with European nations and the EU in recent years. Trump’s election should not stop Europeans from continuing this process, given common interests in areas ranging from economic security to the green transition, as well as mutual suspicion of China.

US tariffs on India could also lead to possibilities for greater collaboration with European countries seeking to de-risk their supply chains, from semiconductors to clean technologies, in which India and other Asian countries such as Vietnam can play a crucial role. The potential broad tariffs of all goods into the US, combined with the likely rollback of US-India clean supply chain initiatives, leaves an opening for investment in the region for European and Asian partners to fill.

If ever there was a time for a massive reinvestment in Europe’s Indo-Pacific engagement, it is now. The EU should continue to seek opportunities to engage partners in Asia on trade, on climate, and on security. Interests merge in all three areas, and the void left by the US can better be managed through active European and Indo-Pacific engagement.  

On trade, this could mean investing in a coordinated offer between Brussels and member states for a new “competitiveness zone” spanning the EU, the UK, Japan, Korea, India, and Australia, with a free flow of data, the trust to jointly develop AI, jointly accessible research funding for renewed technology leadership, and jointly accessible state funding for green industries. This is important in order to go beyond the mantra of defending a rules-based order and together shape global competition within clearly defined new rules.

On climate, Europe should fill the gaps left by American climate denialism. It should drive forward the global climate agenda through multilateral groupings such as the new Global Energy Transition Forum and the Ministerial on Climate Action. The EU and member states should also work with Japan and South Korea through existing green partnerships to raise financial and technical support on energy transition initiatives in major emitters in the region such as Indonesia and India. The EU should also proactively engage in bilateral dialogues with countries in the region to ensure that the bloc’s climate and environmental regulations do not cause new trade frictions. It should draw lessons from the carbon border adjustment mechanism and deforestation law.

On security, this will mean massively enhancing bilateral defence partnerships at the member state level, creating a new EU+1+1+AP4 defence minister dialogue, and setting up a dedicated cyber security dialogue that brings together EU member states, the UK, and India as well as Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

For this to work, the European Commission should appoint an Indo-Pacific envoy – attached directly to the Commission President’s office, and not the European External Action Service.