Among life’s few certainties, Swiss neutrality is up there with death and taxes. At least it was until the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sport dropped quite the bombshell report last month which “consider[s] it necessary to revise Switzerland’s neutrality policy in view of the security policy challenges.”
Swiss neutrality is generally seen as one of the strongest, if not the strongest, expressions of neutrality in the world. The country is not part of any military alliance. It is surrounded by NATO and European Union member states, but it has joined neither organisation, nor does it have bilateral defence guarantees. It prides itself on being home to humanitarian organisations like the International Red Cross, themselves neutral, and to be a place where international peace negotiations can take place “on neutral ground” – like the recent Bürgenstock Ukraine Peace Summit. Neutrality is part of Swiss identity. Public support for neutrality is so high it seems fake: as of 2024, 91 per cent of Swiss citizens want Switzerland to remain neutral. This already includes the dent from Russia’s attack against Ukraine – the average since 2014 is 95 per cent.
Hence, reading a statement like the one above on the Swiss department of defence’s website certainly comes as a surprise. This proposal is not an official statement of intent, but an excerpt from the recently published report by the Security Policy Study Commission, an independent body. The commission was initiated by the Swiss defence department and brought together 6 representatives of the Swiss political parties and 15 experts from academia, administration, and security organisations.
One of the group’s proposals is a “longer-term and more far-reaching revision” of its weapons export and re-export rules. This may, in part, be a reaction to Western criticism in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Switzerland’s weapons export and re-export rules, the “Kriegsmaterialgesetz”, have been used to justify the country’s refusal to allow allies it once sold military equipment to send these systems on to Ukraine. A majority of the commission now recommends changing the law by allowing 25 partner countries to re-export Swiss weapons.[1] Moreover, a majority also recommends increased cooperation with NATO and the EU to strengthen their national defence capabilities. This – together with the proposal to improve Switzerland’s national military capabilities and raise its defence budget from 0.7 per cent to 1 per cent of GDP – is meant to ensure that “Switzerland does not represent a security gap on the continent”.
It is not just the questioning of elements of Swiss neutrality that makes the report remarkable. It also presents a view of the geopolitical reality in 2024 that is rare in Europe in its clear-eyedness. The commission’s description of the current situation is chilling:
“Great power politics, bloc formation and rising regional powers threaten the system of collective security and thus the security of the world…It is undisputed that the global security situation has deteriorated massively, as the system of collective security has been damaged and the political, economic and military dominance of the USA is constantly being challenged by China. A ‘world disorder’ is to be expected for the foreseeable future.”
The commission argues that Europe could fall victim to this global fragmentation: if the centrifugal forces of geopolitics intensify, it could lead to new division and, in the worst case, proxy wars.
It is striking that one of the most sober analyses of the European security situation comes from Switzerland, which by many is seen as the safe, rich, neutral, mountainous country without real enemies, is in no immediate danger, and can position itself slightly outside history. But the commission reminds the reader that threats are connected, especially in Europe – dangers don’t stop at borders, not even mountainous ones, and relying on others for your security could be a losing strategy.
Swiss policy making tends to be slow, even slower than other Western European systems, due to its participative democracy, and, in the case of security and defence policy, a lack of urgency. However, a revised Swiss security policy is to be published by the government by the end of 2025, and the commission’s report will certainly inform its drafting – and its speed.
More importantly, the fact that a large majority of the commission’s members are supporting a fundamental rethinking of Switzerland’s neutrality policy and alliance relationships is a sign of a change in discussions around neutrality. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has led many European neutral or non-aligned countries to question their position. Finland and Sweden abandoned their status completely, joining NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively.
Support for Swiss neutrality remains strong. While the recommendations of the commission were supported either by “a majority” or “a strong majority”, there were minority views which argued in favour of Switzerland becoming more restrictive. For example, on arms exports, the report notes that a minority suggested Switzerland completely renounce its export-oriented arms industry altogether, “as arms exports repeatedly trigger fierce domestic political debates and damage Switzerland’s reputation abroad.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the changing geopolitical context have deeply rattled Switzerland’s view of the world and its place in it. That Russia has officially proclaimed it no longer considers Switzerland neutral because the country applies EU sanctions against Russia may have also encouraged the Swiss rethinking their policies. Fast changes seem unlikely, but as the world becomes less secure, one can wonder whether a Swiss Zeitenwende, or turning point,might eventually be on the table. At a minimum, other Europeans should take note that even in safe, hidden Switzerland, history has returned. The world has changed and all need to act accordingly.
[1] These 25 countries were taken from an existing list which can receive Swiss weapons without needing special permits. They are NATO and EU countries, plus Argentina, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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